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Auction: 18001 - Orders, Decorations and Medals
Lot: 560

(x) Sold by Order of a Direct Descendant

A Second World War Home Guard C.B.E., rare Great War Palestine operations D.S.O. group of nine awarded to Colonel D. E. Brand, Lanarkshire Home Guard, late 1/5th Battalion Highland Light Infantry

Having endured his baptism of fire in the hellish trenches of the Gallipoli peninsula in the summer of 1915 - where he was wounded - he was decorated for leading a nocturnal bayonet charge against 'all the fury' of the enemy on 'Sausage Ridge' in Palestine in November 1917 - and collected a second wound

As C.O. of the 1/5th H.L.I. in the final Allied advance in France in 1918, he maintained his unstinting desire to get to grips with the enemy: it was only the arrival of an excited Transport Officer at 9 a.m. on Armistice Day that finally persuaded the Colonel to cease assaulting enemy positions on the Mons-Jurbise Road

His subsequent award of the C.B.E. for his command of Lanarkshire Home Guard reflects his admirable - and ongoing - sense of duty. It rings true of the story of another Great War officer who became a Home Guard C.O. in the bleak days of 1940: on being invited to invest in Defence Bonds, he replied he wasn't remotely interested in any such bonds - only Attack Bonds - and promptly slammed the receiver down

The Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (C.B.E), Military Division, Commander's 2nd type neck badge, silver-gilt and enamel; Distinguished Service Order, G.V.R., silver-gilt and enamel; 1914-15 Star (Capt. D. E. Brand. High. L.I.); British War and Victory Medals, M.I.D. oak leaf (Major D. E. Brand); Jubilee 1935; Territorial Decoration, G.V.R., silver, silver-gilt; Special Constabulary Long Service Medal, G.V.R. (David Brand); Voluntary Medical Service Medal (Col. D. E. Brand), generally good very fine, housed in a glazed Spink & Son display case, together with the recipient's miniature dress awards (18)



C.B.E. London Gazette 2 June 1944.

D.S.O. London Gazette 22 March 1918:

'For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. He led his company in a bayonet charge on an enemy position in the dark without a previous reconnaissance. He captured the position which dominated the crossing of a river, and thereby secured the crossing for the remainder of the troops. After holding his ground during the night, he captured a further enemy position on the following morning. He showed splendid leadership and skill.'

David Ernest Brand was born in Glasgow in November 1884 and was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in the Highland Light Infantry in March 1909.

Baptism of fire - Gallipoli - first wound

A Captain in the 1/5th Battalion at the commencement of hostilities, he was embarked for Egypt in May 1915 and thence, in the first week of July, for Gallipoli, where he came ashore as 2nd-in Command of 'C' Company on the 3rd. Greeted by ' a few rounds of shrapnel at irregular intervals', he and his men made a special effort to ding-in and complete their new trenches.

A few days later - on the 12th - Brand was ordered with his company to go to the assistance of 1/7th Battalion and ended up in a lively engagement with the Turks, under heavy fire from as close as 30 yards range. Two of his fellow offices were killed. Three days later, he and his men were ordered to occupy Achi Baba nullah, an operation undertaken at night. They held their ground until relieved 48 hours later.

In these actions in early July, the Battalion suffered a total of 19 killed, 73 wounded and 17 missing. Not a few of these casualties were officers and Brand found himself appointed to the command of 'A' Company in the first week of August. He was quickly back in action, leading a scouting mission at Krithia nullah: a firefight developed and his party suffered two casualties. At some point in September-October, possibly later, Brand was himself wounded and evacuated. The regimental history summarises the Battalion's Gallipoli experience in the following terms:

'It was with very mixed feelings that we left Gallipoli. When we landed in July it had been with the hope that we would be successful in driving the Turk north from the positions which he held and even some had pictured themselves taking part in a triumphal entry into Constantinople. We had soon realised the impossibility of the situation and in reality were glad to get away from the scene of so many disappointments and hardships. Our greatest regret was the number of officers and men whom we had left behind, and it seemed wrong that we could not remain to avenge the sacrifice which they had made.'

Palestine - second wound - D.S.O.

Re-joining the Battalion at Ballah in March 1916, Brand would be heavily engaged over the course of the next two years. His unit would cross the Sinai, fight in the First and Second Battles of Gaza, and also play a notable part in the action at 'Sausage Ridge', near Deir Sineid, in November 1917. Colonel Morrison takes up the story:

'At 12.30 orders were received from the Brigade to have strong patrols ready to push into Herbieh to cover the right flank of an attack to be delivered by the 155th Brigade against the ridge about 4000 yards south by east of Hesi Summit. This was not necessary, for at 14.45 Colonel Morrison received instructions for an attack on the southern continuation of the 155th Brigade's objective. Attacks of this sort are of necessity quickly arranged, and this resulted in our going into action without any machine-guns accompanying the infantry, as the enemy's shell-fire had made it necessary to withdraw their mules to cover and there was no time to get them back for the start, nor did artillery fire on either sides play any important part in the coming battle. There was desultory shelling by both sides till darkness fell, but we felt sure that neither side suffered any casualties from that source.

From our position the ridge, known afterwards to the Battalion as 'Sausage Ridge', was a crest line, quite four thousand yards away, with orange groves and undulating country between, thickly sown with enemy trenches, just newly evacuated by the Turks. The 5th A. & S.H. were to attack on our immediate right, and the 6th H.L.I. to deliver a converging attack from the south-west. The ridge was to be carried as soon as possible, and packs were dumped to make the moving lighter. The frontage of each battalion was approximately 400 yards and a tree marked the centre of our objective. The bearing was 113° and as the tree disappeared almost immediately after the attack was launched, the advance was compass-directed. As we stood, the objective appeared to be a slight height just beyond a low saddle in a nearer ridge of hills. Behind this ridge ran the main road from Gaza northwards, and it was certain that the enemy would defend it desperately.

'C' and 'D' Companies were in the firing-line and at 16.00 the men dropped down through the orange groves of Herbieh, pulling the ripening fruit as they passed, and made rapidly for the distant ridge. Before they were half-way across the level ground darkness had set in. The Argyll's on the right were directing but the 155th Brigade on the left was completely out of touch. Firing could be heard from their direction and, as a matter of fact, they had enough to do to hold up an enemy attack on their left from Askalon. At 17.15 the enemy on our own front opened a very heavy fire from rifles and machine-guns, and, as we drew nearer, he began to put up flares in large numbers. It was impossible to keep in touch with Battalion Headquarters, and the conduct of the attack and the use of reserves had to be decided by the officer in the front line. Thus it was that both the reserve companies were put into the fight before any orders could be received from Colonel Morrison.

The configuration of the ground constituting the immediate objective was afterwards ascertained to be very different from what it had appeared to be when viewed from a considerable distance in the gathering darkness. Instead of a long unbroken ridge our attack fell upon an isolated mound lying in the centre of a decided indentation on the main ridge. In the first charge the Battalion carried this mound and that part of the ridge immediately behind it with the bayonet. Further progress was impossible owing to machine-gun fire from defiladed positions on the main ridge, while bombs and rifle grenades were freely used by the enemy. Our men were able to hold on to the mound and make an effort at consolidation, assisted by the Argyll's, but they were soon forced back from the portion of the ridge which they had occupied. They fell back to a slight nullah where they were rallied and hurriedly reorganised. A second advance and their bayonets retook part of the ridge, but only to be driven off again. Another time and yet another did they return and capture the ridge, only to find it untenable. Then Major Findlay decided that it was useless to make a further attempt and that it was better to hold on to the mound which had been to some extent consolidated and try to establish a line running N.N.W. from it. But the enemy pushed his machine-guns forward and concentrated all his fury on our precarious position, which he enfiladed from the left and left rear. Gradually its defenders were driven westwards along the west of the mound into the depression behind, where they rallied and re-formed, and from which they retook the position. After a game effort to hold on they were once more compelled to retire. By this time the fog of battle had enveloped everything. Major Findlay and Captain Townsend were dead on the top of the hill. Major Brand and eight other officers were out of action; 190 men were dead or wounded.'

Having fought up through Palestine in the ensuing months, the gallant highlanders were stationed at Sarona. They were visited by H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught on 18 March 1918, on which occasion Brand - recovered from his wounds - was presented with his D.S.O.; he was also mentioned in despatches (London Gazette 11 June 1920, refers).

Western Front - gallant C.O.

The Battalion was next embarked for the Western Front and it reached its new positions - on Vimy Ridge - in May 1918. It would not be until August, however, before orders were received for a major push. It was in this operation that Brand assumed command of the Battalion. Colonel Morrison takes up the story:

'At 2 a.m. on the 24 August orders were received for an attack to be made by the Brigade that morning. On the previous day the 156th Brigade had advanced the line some distance and the general plan of our attack was passing through the 156th Brigade to attack eastwards, finally assaulting and consolidating a portion of the Hindenburg Line front and support system. The attack was to be delivered by ourselves (on the left) and 6th H.L.I. (on the right), the 7th being in reserve. At 4.45 the Battalion moved in artillery formation ('A' and 'D' Companies forming the first line, and 'B' and 'C' the second) to the position of assembly at the railway embankment. This move sounds simple on paper, but at night over unknown country the difficulties may be appreciated by giving the experiences in this early part of the battle of the O.C. 'D' Company. Shortly after 3 a.m. he received a message by orderly to report at Headquarters for instructions. His company was lying in an old disused trench, where it had arrived in the dark. The ground all around was broken up with large and old shell holes, covered with grass and weeds and in addition high and low wire entanglements, which alone would have made negotiating this part a difficult task even by daylight. He receives his orders in an old dug-out lit by a flickering candle and is referred to a map of small scale and told to move his company independently and at once to a rendezvous about 1 or 1-1/2 miles away. There is no time to explain matters fully to his platoon commanders and N.C.O.s. No one has been within miles of this ground before. The company falls in - into this network of holes and wire - in the dark, and the harassed company commander wonders if it ever can possibly move in any direction at all. Finally, with the aid of a luminous compass, he moves his company in single file in approximately the right direction, arriving finally at the railway embankment.

At 5.30 a.m. the advance was continued, our bombardment opening at 7 a.m., when we came under shell-fire. The river Cojeul was successfully crossed, a river only by name, and on crossing the sunken road beyond, the companies extended. Soon after Colonel Neilson was severely wounded and Captain Fyfe took command until Captain Parr, the next senior could be informed. The advance continued to about 300 yards of the wire in front of the first objective. Here it was held up by our own barrage, which was falling in some cases behind our front line. This was about 9 a.m. At 9.15 a.m. the right company ('A') was withdrawn about 50 yards to clear our barrage; at the same time small parties of the enemy were seen withdrawing from his front line. At this stage of the attack there was a gap of some 1500 yards between our left and the nearest troops on their outer flank. At 10 a.m. our barrage still fell, entirely from heavy artillery. Captain Fyfe then consulted the O.C. 6th H.L.I. (Colonel James Anderson, D.S.O.) as to the advisability of pushing on through it. They decided to remain in the present position. By this time numerous wires had been sent asking the guns to stop. At 10.30 a.m. Captain Parr took over command. At 11.15 a.m. our heavies stopped and two platoons of 'A' Company and two platoons of 'D' Company under Captain L. H. Watson advanced against the Hindenburg Line. The wire was exceptionally thick and strong and had not been destroyed by our fire and on it the enemy concentrated heavy machine-gun and trench-mortar fire. Casualties were heavy and at 12.15 p.m. the assaulting platoons, being unable to get through the wire, withdrew to their old line to allow the trench-mortar and machine-gun fire to be neutralised.

At 1.15 p.m. the Brigade commander came to Headquarters and an assault with the 6th H.L.I. was arranged to follow a fifteen-minute bombardment on the Hindenburg front and support lines. Zero time for the assault was fixed at 3.45 p.m. No bombardment took place till 3.43 p.m. At 3.46 p.m. the same assaulting platoons again advanced. The wire again caused a serious check, but by 5 p.m. was penetrated, but there was still 300 yards to be traversed before reaching the enemy's front trenches, and when crossing this part continuous trench-mortar and machine-gun fire came from the enemy's left flank, which was not being attacked. A platoon of 'C' Company was sent up to prolong the left flank, taking up reserve S.A.A. At 5.30 p.m. the enemy opened a heavy bombardment, but a quarter of an hour later an assault had been made and a footing obtained in the first objective. This was all, however, as there was no support on the left. Touch had been lost on the right and from both sides and the at the front a counter-attack had commenced. This might have been successfully dealt with had casualties not been so heavy. As it was the officers in the trench rightly ordered the men back and the small part of the Hindenburg Line captured was evacuated, a few of our men being unfortunately captured. Only two German prisoners were brought back, but from the nature of the operation to bring back even two was no small achievement. A line was organised as before the assault and at 8 p.m. the line was retired two hundred yards to conform with the line formed on our right. This line consisted mainly of odd shell holes and ditches, a most uncomfortable place, but suitable for meeting the heavy bombardment put down by the enemy between 8 p.m. and 9.30 p.m. and at 4 a.m. next morning. The enemy appeared to be well shaken as our defensive patrols observed no signs of activity in front of his line.'

Brand's comrades had taken 186 casualties during the evening operations, having earlier struggled under the heat of the day, exposed to machine-gun fire and accurate shelling, and well-observed by enemy aircraft.

Just two days into his new offensive, Brand led the attack on Riencourt on 27 August, in support of the 6th and 7th Battalions. Casualties rose to 295 officers and men. Removed from the frontline, his men's spirit remained strong, more so after an issue of rum, when 'songs and jokes filled the air'.

Back in action at Moeuvres on 16 September, one of his N.C.O.s - Corporal D. F. Hunter - won the Victoria Cross. Detailed to take-out an advanced post, he was soon completely cut-off. Nevertheless, a few men under his gallant command maintained their position and repelled frequent counter-attacks, until the evening of the third day of the push, when they were relieved; six of his party were awarded the Military Medal.

Brand's men were still in action on the day of the Armistice, attacking and capturing a section of the Mons-Jurbise Road at 7 a.m., before an excited Transport Officer could deliver the news of Armistice at 9 a.m.

The latter days

Appointed Chairman of the Glasgow T.A. and A.F. Association, and of the Glasgow Academicals War Memorial Trust, he was awarded the Territorial Decoration in 1925.

Brand was subsequently appointed Deputy Lieutenant of Lanarkshire in 1942 and served as Colonel of the Lanarkshire Home Guard. He was awarded the C.B.E. in 1944. A member of the Caledonian and Western Clubs, he died on 16 March 1948; sold with original portrait photograph and copied research.

Reference Sources:

Morrison, Colonel F. L., The Fifth Battalion, Highland Light Infantry in the War 1914-18 (Privately published by MacLehose, Jackson and Co., Glasgow, 1921), which may be accessed via V.Dhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/20250/20250-h/20250-h.htm
Shah, Idries, Darkest England (The Octagon Press, London, 1987).
Westlake, R., British Regiments at Gallipoli (Pen & Sword, 1996).


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£2,400