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Auction: 15003 - Orders, Decorations, Campaign Medals and Militaria
Lot: 116

(x) The Historically Important Army Large Gold Medal to Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost, Bt., 'The Defender of Canada' - The Governor General and Commander in Chief of British North America, 1811-1815, Who Was Inextricably Linked to Almost Every Major Action of the War of 1812, And Who 'Arguably, After the Duke of Wellington... Held One of the Most Important Commands in the British Empire During the Napoleonic Period... Sir George Prevost Became Responsible For Defending a Group of North American Colonies that Stretched as Far as Paris Did From Moscow, And He Eventually Commanded One of the Largest Overseas Forces Employed By the British During the Napoleonic Wars'
General Officer's Large Army Gold Medal for Martinique (Lieut. Genl. Sir George Prevost.), extremely fine, with all the proper gold suspension fittings and full neck cravat

Lieutenant General Sir George James Marc Prevost, Bt. was born in New Jersey in 1794. He was the son of Major General Augustin Prevost, a Protestant Swiss who had been commissioned into the 60th Foot (or also known as the Royal Americans) in the British army. The family had accumulated considerable wealth from land speculation in the colonies of New York and Nova Scotia, and because of his father's service George became a naturalized Briton. Prevost received a military education in a private academy and was commissioned (aged 12) in the 60th Foot in 1779.

Early Success in the West Indies
Prevost rose to Lieutenant-Colonel, and the command of the 3/60th in 1794. He led his men in action for the first time against the rebel Caribs on St. Vincent, 'the fortuitous arrival of Prevost and the 3/60th at Kingston [sic] in June 1795, in response to an appeal by Governor James Seton for re-enforcements, strengthened the force on St. Vincent sufficiently for the garrison commander, Colonel Baldwin Leighton, to attack the insurgent forces deployed at Vigie ridge on the south-eastern side of the island... Leighton organized the 800 men from his own 46th Regiment, a contingent of local levies, and Prevost's battalion into three columns. Two of the columns drove the insurgents from their position toward Prevost, who was positioned to cut off their retreat. Over 200 insurgents were killed and their commander captured for the loss of sixty soldiers, killed and wounded. Prevost's first action had gone well, and the entire force was directed to Mount Young, which commanded the road on the eastern side. Patrols were then sent out to clear the region of rebels.' (Defender of Canada, Sir George Prevost And The War Of 1812, Major J.R. Grodzinski refers)

Prevost continued to be involved with the fighting on St. Vincent for the next twelve months. He acquitted himself well with limited resources, and raw recruits, including on one occasion repelling some 20 attempts to storm a position he held. Prevost was wounded twice during the campaign and obtained leave to return to England to recover from his wounds. In 1798 at the age of 31 Prevost was promoted Brigadier General and ordered back to the West Indies to take command of the garrison at Barbados. He quickly found himself appointed commandant of the newly acquired island of St. Lucia. It was here that Prevost discovered a talent for colonial administration in difficult circumstances, 'His first concern was to address the discontent of the French residents, who feared the loss of their legal and religious rights. Prevost adopted a conciliatory policy towards these concerns, reforming the law courts and securing guarantees for the Catholic Church that won the hearts of the populace. Due to the satisfactory manner in which he conducted the administration of public affairs and following representations by the Court of Appeal to George III, Prevost was appointed Lieutenant Governor of the colony in April 1801. Unfortunately for Prevost, the climate aggravated his wounds, which seem not to have fully healed, and it was with much regret that in March 1802 he departed for England.' (ibid)

A Just Reward - Lieutenant Governor of Dominica
Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Trigge, Commander of the British Forces in the West Indies, praised and recommended Prevost to the Duke of York. This was heeded, and upon his return to England, Prevost was offered the post of lieutenant governor of Dominica. He accepted and was in situ by 1803. As hostilities had been renewed with France Prevost was keen to volunteer his services. Lieutenant General William Grinfield was the newly appointed Commander of British Forces in the West Indies, and he was all too happy to accept a man of Prevost's experience into his service.

Prevost was appointed as Grinfield's second-in-command, and arrived with the combined British force off the coast of the French held island of St. Lucia, 21.6.1803. Over three thousand troops were landed and Prevost proceeded at the head of one of three columns to the attack and capture of the fort atop Morne Fortuné.

The plan was well executed, and the fort and its batteries were taken in a relatively short time. Grinfield praised Prevost's conduct, and the army moved on to Tobago. Prevost returned to carry out his duties as lieutenant governor of Dominica.

It was fortunate that Prevost returned to the island, for the following year saw a change in French strategy in the West Indies. By February 1805 a French naval force of ten ships under the command of Rear-Admiral Missiessy, combined with 3,500 troops under General Joseph Legrange, arrived in the area with a plan to land military stores on Martinique and Guadeloupe before capturing Dominica.

The French force arrived off the capital of Dominica, Roseau, early in the morning of 22nd February, and against them was 'Prevost, who had been promoted to major general in January 1805, commanded a 700 man garrison comprising 250 men of the 46th, fifteen gunners from the Royal Artillery, and a seventy man detachment of the 1st West India Regiment, supported by several companies of militia and a contingent of sailors who manned the coastal batteries.' (ibid)

What followed over the next five days was a game of 'cat and mouse' skilfully played out by Prevost and his vastly outnumbered troops. When it looked as if the island would be overrun Prevost prevented the French Admiral from consolidating his gains, including by using a forced overnight march through treacherous terrain, and the sovereignty of the island was held. The losses incurred by Prevost's force was estimated at 19 killed, 21 wounded, and 8 taken prisoner, whilst it was believed that the French had suffered some 300 casualties.

By the summer of 1805 Prevost's health was again in decline and he had to resign his governorship of Dominica. He returned to the UK, where he was appointed lieutenant governor of Portsmouth. Prevost was created a Baronet for his distinguished service during the defence of Dominica. In September 1806 he was appointed Colonel Commandant of the 5/60th Foot.

Prevost was keen for another overseas appointment, and with the continuing breakdown in Anglo-American relations at the time, he did not have to wait long. In January 1808, Prevost was appointed as governor and commander of the forces in the Maritime Provinces of North America. He set off for Nova Scotia the following month, with the local rank of lieutenant general, and a brigade of regulars comprising of battalions from the 7th, 8th, 13th and 23rd Regiments of Foot.

Nova Scotia - A Talent For Administration
Prevost arrived at the important colonial free port of Halifax in April 1808. The vast majority of his brigade set up there, primarily to act as a deterrent to the Americans. Prevost 'had received private and secret instructions from Lord Castlereagh, the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, "which may be of use in exigencies" authorizing him to exploit American discord, particularly in New England, where many politicians, mercantile leaders, and inhabitants disapproved of the hostile measures against Britain. Castlereagh directed Prevost to "gain Intelligence with regard to the projects of the American Government in General, and particularly those states bordering upon his Majesty's Territories." In the event of hostilities, Prevost was authorized, if he found the "adjacent states indisposed to active Warfare, and willing to enter into any private arrangement for mutual convenience in point of Trade," to offer British commodities and goods... Prevost also had permission to prepare and circulate "propaganda which will show the Americans that it would be unwise for their Government to engage in war with Great Britain." (ibid)

Prevost set about implementing wide-ranging changes to the Province, and how it was run. He immediately carried out a six week tour of Nova Scotia with a particular focus on how to improve its defence. He complemented his regular troops (often over the following years removed for service elsewhere - including Europe) by establishing locally raised regiments and militia. Perceiving the militiamen that he inherited to be both poorly equipped and poorly trained, Prevost put in place new training structures and over the course of the next two years created levy's to provide funds for arms and ammunition.

Not for the first time Prevost found himself working with limited resources, and as a consequence having to be creative. He identified that the Native Indians could be a useful source of manpower, and recognised that they had been consistently poorly treated over a number of years. Provisions were put in place for the distribution of supplies, arms and clothing to improve relations with the Mi'kmaq.

These measures were to be called upon at a later date, due to the advent of a new President (James Madison) who initially appeared to be keen to explore more peaceful negotiation. With the tension temporarily removed from the area focus once again resumed upon French held islands in the West Indies.

Martinique - A Return to a Soldier's Life
In December 1808 Prevost and 2,800 troops left Halifax en-route to join forces with Rear-Admiral Alexander Cochrane and Lieutenant-General Sir George Beckwith.

On the 30th January 1809 a British force under the overall command of Beckwith was landed on the French held island of Martinique. The land force of approximately 10,000 men was comprised of troops from the 7th, 8th, 13th, 15th, 23rd, 25th, 60th, 63rd and 90th Regiments of Foot, additionally aided by the 1st West Indian Regiment and men of the Royal York Rangers. Beckwith remained offshore in H.M.S. Neptune, whilst the troops were split into two divisions under the command of Prevost and Major-General Frederick Maitland. Prevost was given command of the larger 1st Division of 7,000 men.

Maitland landed his division first, at Sainte-Luce, supervised by Captain W.C. Fahie, R.N. The other division was subsequently landed at Le Robert. A third force, under a Major Henderson and consisting entirely of 600 soldiers from the Royal York Rangers, landed at Cape Salomon near Les Anses-d'Arlet on the south-western peninsula to secure the entrance to Fort-de-France Bay.

During the first day of the invasion, the two main forces made rapid progress inland, forcing the French back. On the 1st February Prevost's division under the direct command of Brigadier-General D. Houghton attacked the defenders on the heights of Desfourneaux and Surirey. Fighting was fierce throughout the next two days, as the outnumbered French used the fortified high ground to hold back a series of frontal assaults. By the 3rd February the French had been forced to withdraw to Fort Desaix near the capital. Progress was also made at Cape Salomon, where the appearance of British troops panicked the French defenders into burning a naval brig and retreating to the small island, Ilot aux Ramiers, offshore. Henderson's men, assisted by a naval brigade under Captain G. Cockburn, R.N. set up batteries on the coast and by 4th February had bombarded the island into surrender, opening the principal harbour of Martinique to naval attack.

On 8th February, Maitland's force arrived on the western side of Fort Desaix and laid siege to it. Two days later Prevost's force linked up with Maitland's, to continue the siege on Fort Desaix, which had become the only remaining point of resistance.

For nine days, 'the British soldiers and sailors of the expeditionary force constructed gun batteries and trenches around the fort, bringing ashore large quantities of supplies and equipment in readiness for a lengthy siege. At 16:30 on 19th February the preparations were complete and the bombardment began, 14 heavy cannon and 28 mortars beginning a continuous attack on the fort which lasted for the next four days. French casualties in the overcrowded fort were severe, with 200 men killed or wounded. British casualties were minimal, with five killed and 11 wounded, principally in an explosion in an ammunition tent manned by sailors from HMS Amaranthe. At 12:00 on 23rd February, Villaret de Joyeuse's trumpeter was sent to the British camp with a message proposing surrender terms. These were unacceptable to Beckwith and the bombardment resumed at 22:00, continuing until 09:00 the following morning when three white flags were raised over the fort and the French admiral surrendered unconditionally. The bombardment had cracked the roof of the fort's magazine, and there were fears that further shelling might have ignited the gunpowder and destroyed the building completely.' (The Naval History of Great Britain, W. James refers)

British losses for the expedition were 3 officers and 81 men killed, 9 officers and 325 men wounded. Upon entering the fort, 'amongst the booty were two of the cherished French eagle standards of the 62nd and 80th Regiments which were the first to be taken to England and were lain at the King's feet with much pomp and celebration.'

Prevost received the praise of Beckwith for his, and his troops, conduct during the campaign. They then embarked for their return to Halifax in March 1809. Over the coming year the situation once again worsened between Britain and America. In 1811 'when the British government was looking for a replacement for the ailing Sir James Craig as governor general and commander in chief of North America, Prevost was the natural choice.' (Defender of Canada, Sir George Prevost And The War Of 1812, Major J.R. Grodzinski refers)

Governor General and Commander in Chief of British North America - A Natural Progression
Prevost arrived in Quebec to take up his new position on 13th September 1811. In a similar approach to his appointment in Nova Scotia, Prevost set about trying to gauge the colonial defensive strength of his position. As well as the growing pressures emanating from America, Prevost discovered that much had been done by his predecessor to alienate the French speaking population in Lower Canada.

It was a challenging posting at an awkward time, where Prevost's preparations were hampered by the British Government's strategic focus on the war in Europe. Funding and reinforcements were funnelled closer to home and strict instructions were given to Prevost with regard to his authority in foreign affairs and military operations. He could not declare war or strike offensively without informing, or receiving the instruction of, the government which was several thousand miles away.

All this despite, 'arguably, after the Duke of Wellington, Prevost held one of the most important commands in the British Empire during the Napoleonic period. When war broke out between Great Britain and America in June 1812, Sir George Prevost became responsible for defending a group of North American colonies that stretched as far as Paris did from Moscow, and he eventually commanded one of the largest overseas forces employed by the British during the Napoleonic Wars. By December 1814, the strength of the British army in Upper and Lower Canada numbered 31,000 British regular and provincial troops, several thousand embodied militia, and the most powerful naval force ever assembled on the Great Lakes. Prevost's wide range of responsibilities included overseeing affairs with Native allies, ensuring the proper management of logistical matters, monitoring the needs of naval construction and personnel requirements, supervising the conduct of colonial governments and their fiscal management, and commanding the defence of the Canadas. Prevost's authority was not limited to land operations. Each of these responsibilities had its own unique problems that, when combined with the instructions Prevost received from his superiors, added further complexities to an already challenging situation...

As the Commander in Chief of British North America, Prevost bore a very heavy weight of responsibility. For the first two years of war, his objective was "to hold the line" and he held it well. Only in the spring of 1814, as the war approached its third year, did he receive the reinforcements necessary to carry out offensive operations, albeit limited ones, and it was the failure of one of these operations, against Plattsburgh in 1814, that led to his recall.' (ibid)

Where Prevost was successful in his preparations for war, was in his civil administration. He raised men in a similar fashion to his previous time of employment, improved relations with catholic Lower Canada, established communication routes along the Upper St Lawrence River and improved relations with the Native Nations in an attempt to get manpower.

Prevost provided a detailed report for the British Government in May 1812 with regard to the defence of British North America, in which despite his best efforts, he concluded 'If the Americans are determined to attack Canada, it would be in vain the General should flatter himself with hopes of making an effectual defence of the open Country, unless powerfully assisted by Home.' (ibid)

Prevost also 'acknowledged another possibility, one in which the Americans, for various reasons, might experience difficulties in raising armies, formulating strategy, or executing their plans. In this case, Prevost anticipated that "all predatory or ill concerted attacks undertaken presumptuously and without sufficient means can be resisted or repulsed." (ibid)

War of 1812 - Early Success at Fort Mackinac and Queenston Heights
War was declared in June 1812, and it was with the above sense of realism that Prevost employed his meagre military budget on defensive strategy. He sent reinforcements north to Major-General Brock in Upper Canada, when Brigadier General Hull's North West Army crossed the Detroit River into Canada. He was determined to support Upper Canada, and received good news when in July he heard of the successful capture of Fort Mackinac. This British success threatened Hull's flank, and combined with the actions of Native allies forced the American troops to start their retreat back to Detroit the following month.

On the 16th August 1812 Brock's troops pursued the Americans, by crossing the Detroit River under cover of fire from his artillery and supporting fire from the Queen Charlotte. Hull capitulated with barely a shot fired, and a large quantity of weapons and stores fell into British hands, as well as the surrender of the entire Michigan Territory to Great Britain. Brock had exploited British control of the inland waters, enhanced and consolidated by Prevost, to corner Hull. The latter's attack was poorly conceived, and Prevost's pre-war preparations had proved adequate up to this point.

Early success continued at Queenston Heights on the 13th October. The American attack was a hastily planned attempt to make up for the disaster at Fort Detroit before the campaigning season ended. The attempt to establish a foothold on the Canadian side of the Niagara failed when the Americans were unable to land the majority of their assault force. Despite outnumbering the British forces by almost 3 to 1, the American force was mainly comprised of Militia and their discipline under artillery fire let them down. Brock was killed during the battle, and despite not always agreeing with his commander's cautious approach, his death was another blow to the resources at Prevost's disposal.

During the first three months of 1813, Prevost undertook a tour of reconnaissance around Upper Canada. At times he averaged up to 70 miles a day in an attempt to prepare his provinces for the renewal of the campaigning season. The growing American position on Sackets Harbour had ceded naval superiority of the lakes to them.

Caution at Sackets Harbour
At the start of the campaigning season of 1813, the main American forces on the border between the United States and Canada had been concentrated at Sackets Harbour. The naval squadron which Chauncey had created was superior to the opposing British and Canadian-manned squadron at Kingston, and the troops under Major General Henry Dearborn could outnumber the British at any point on their extended front. The force included some 5,000 regulars and militia. The Americans immediately exploited their control of Lake Ontario, and plans were made to attack Kingston, York and Fort George.

On the 27th April 1813, Chauncey put his naval superiority to good use by transporting troops across Lake Ontario to attack York. Despite the detonation of the grand magazine at Fort York costing the Americans 250 casualties the attack was a partial success. Prevost was pressured into replacing Major-General Robert Sheaffe (commanding Upper Canada), as a consequence of his indecision during the battle. The American casualties did however delay the attack on Fort George and forced a return to Sackets Harbour. Importantly Prevost received reinforcements from the Royal Navy in early May. The arrival of Commodore James Yeo and approximately 200 officers and seaman attempted to readdress the balance.

While Prevost 'dealt with the results of the raid on York, the enemy struck again and 27th May 1813, following a two-day bombardment of Fort George, an American army landed on the Niagara Peninsula. Its objective was to encircle and capture British forces in the area of Fort George... Prevost was in Kingston, where, on 26th May, after studying reports that Fort George was under tremendous bombardment that had begun on the previous day, he concluded this was a prelude to an enemy assault on the fort and proposed a bold plan to relieve pressure in the Niagara Peninsula and to divert American attention. He would attack the enemy base at Sackets Harbour. Prevost first conceived this idea on 22nd May, when an American spy confirmed that Chauncey's squadron was at the western end of the lake. He ordered Yeo to reconnoitre Sackets Harbour during the night of 26th May, and at noon the next day Yeo confirmed that Chauncey's squadron was absent and that the garrison appeared to be weak. Once he knew that Fort George was under heavy bombardment, and that Chauncey was supporting the assault on the fort, Prevost appointed Colonel Edward Baynes to command the raid and began planning earnest.' (ibid)

On the 27th May Prevost's force hastily assembled and embarked upon Yeo's ships, 'the 900 man assault force included most of the Kingston garrison and Yeo's Lake Ontario squadron. It was drawn from the light companies of eight different regiments and included two field artillery pieces and forty warriors. Less than one third of the regular troops had seen any action at all.' (ibid)

Prevost led the expedition himself, delegating the command of the troops once they were ashore to Baynes. The British force arrived off Sackets Harbour around 4.30am on the 28th. The wind was very light, which made it difficult for Yeo to manoeuvre close to the shore. The conditions were alien to him, as the waters were uncharted and he was unfamiliar with the local depths of water. Several reconnaissances were carried out, including by Yeo personally, before he and Baynes decided to call off the attack. Meanwhile a detachment of Natives and regulars had been sent out from the squadron in three canoes and a gunboat. They had intercepted and captured 115 American troops which were en-route to reinforce Sackets Harbour. Over a hundred American troops that managed to escape the action, landed at Stoney Point and fled into the woods. Encouraged by this action, and on the assumption that the defences of Sackets Harbour would be of a similar level to what they had just encountered, Yeo and Baynes (with the approval of Prevost) agreed to proceed with the attack.

Given the lateness of the hour, the attack had to be delayed until the following morning. The defence that greeted them on the morning of the 29th was unexpected, and had in fact been devised a year earlier. Approximately 800 men and two guns were stationed at Horse Island, beyond that was the main defensive position centred on two block-houses, 'here a regiment of dismounted dragoons and elements of three regular infantry regiments, equivalent in number to the entire British assault force, were expected to defeat any attack. Behind them was Fort Tompkins, surrounded by a stockade and armed with a powerful 32-pounder gun; farther beyond that, in the low ground was Navy Point, a peninsula covered by six guns ranging from 12 to 32-pounders manned by experienced sailors. Overlooking the harbour from the high ground to the east was Fort Volunteer, which was armed with six or seven guns. Altogether the strength of the defenders amounted to 1,500 men and sixteen or seventeen pieces of ordnance, which outnumbered the attacker's ground force and also enjoyed an eight-to-one advantage in artillery.' (ibid)

Initially the British troops met with success, as they landed on Horse Island and forced their way through the militia held positions. Despite the artillery ranged against them Prevost's two columns of attacking troops advanced upon the block houses. These were attacked, but Baynes' men were beaten back with heavy losses, 'by this point, the supporting fire from the British gunboats ended, as the line of fire was masked by a rise in the ground. Baynes was now in a difficult position: he faced a strong, entrenched enemy with clear fields of fire and artillery support, while his infantry were in the open with no artillery support and his force had been reduced by this time to some 300 men.

Prevost now intervened and ordered a second attack. The right of the British line faced overwhelming fire and was rebuffed, but the troops on the left cleared one of the barrack buildings. An attempt to cross the open space to the next barracks was met by heavy fire, however, and more casualties were suffered. Among the wounded were two senior officers, Major Robert Moodie of the 104th and Major Thomas Evans, commanding the companies from the 8th Foot. Another key officer, Captain Andrew Gray, who had helped plan the landings, was killed. Major William Drummond took a message to the Americans demanding their surrender, which was refused. Baynes, who had limited command experience, was uncertain what to do next and consulted Prevost. The commander in chief intervened a second and final time, ordering the force to withdraw and re-embark.

It was the correct decision. The British attack force had been ashore for five hours at this point and while they had advanced in land more than 1,200 yards nearly unmolested and were now at the last obstacle before the dockyard, this progress proved deceptive. The infantry had taken casualties of approximately 30 percent, and three of the key officers - Young, Evans, and Drummond - were unable to continue. The attackers were unable to break through the Americans main defensive position, where the protected defenders enjoyed artillery support. Many soldiers were running around aimlessly and in confusion... At this critical moment, Prevost directed his attention back toward the stationary British squadron and considered where the American fleet might be. If Chauncey's squadron arrived, it would be disastrous.' (ibid)

The American fleet did not materialise for several days, and the blame for the withdrawal, unsuccessful action, and some 200 casualties was placed at Prevost's feet. It did not compare well with the American success at York and Fort George. The plan had been bold in its timing, and in that successfully carrying out an amphibious operation was extremely hard to achieve even with experienced commanding officers. These officers were not at Prevost's disposal, and as he was present at the action, combined with his increasingly unpopular cautious approach his reputation suffered.

The positive that arrived as a consequence of the action at Sackets Harbour, was Chauncey's decision to withdraw naval support from the American army at the head of Lake Ontario. He determined that it was more important to be positioned in Sackets Harbour to protect the production of his new vessel the USS General Pike. This action ceded control of Lake Ontario back to the British Navy, and 'Prevost immediately exploited this turn of events by sending the commodore [Yeo] to deliver 220 men of the 8th Foot along with much needed supplies to Vincent's army at Burlington Bay. Commodore Yeo sailed on 3rd June. Meanwhile, Vincent approved a plan put forward by Lieutenant Colonel John Harvey to attack the American camp at nearby Stoney Creek. During a night action on 5-6th June 1813, 700 British troops confronted more than 3,000 Americans, captured their two generals, and left the defenders in disarray. On 7th June, the Americans withdrew eastward to Forty Mile Creek. By this time, Yeo had arrived and worked out a plan with Vincent to cut off the American force, but Dearborn, the U.S. commander at Fort George, fearing this might occur, ordered it to withdraw to the fort... By the second week of June, all American forces were back at Fort George and by and large remained there for the summer. Encouraged by these successes, Yeo next ranged around Lake Ontario ferrying troops, bombarding shore targets, landing raiding parties...' (ibid)

Steps had been made to readdress the balance after Sackets Harbour, however, Prevost's superiors in Britain expected the enemy to be defeated. The American force at Fort George was unable to break out, and was less inclined to do so after being ambushed at Beaver Dams, 24th June 1813. The British force primarily comprising of Native allies captured approximately 500 Americans during a vicious skirmish. Prevost's efforts with his allies were bearing fruit.

The following month the American forces attempted their own amphibious action, an assault on Burlington Heights. Upon arrival it was decided that the defensive position was too strong and Chauncey re-embarked the troops for another attack on York. They landed unopposed (the British Regulars had rushed to support Burlington Heights) on the 31st July and burnt the barracks. Finding nothing of any real worth they departed for Niagara.

Prevost left his command post and returned to the front line around Fort George at the end of August. With the situation on Lake Erie and around Detroit worsening from a supplies perspective he considered a general assault on Fort George. However, he was not willing to plan the attack until a full reconnaissance of the enemy's defences had been carried out. He could not afford to sacrifice resources he did not have, or indeed suffer another heavy defeat. Prevost himself inspected the American defences from the deck of one of Yeo's ships. The general conclusion was that it would be too complicated and to costly, with perhaps thoughts of Sackets Harbour still in the back of his mind.

Instead Prevost recognised the need for naval dominance on Lake Ontario. The American position at Fort George massively disrupted the line of communication to Lake Erie and Fort Detroit. Prevost authorised Yeo to seek out a major action with Chauncey. The three 'engagements' that followed in August through to early September proved a great disappointment to Prevost. Neither Yeo or Chauncey would engage fully unless the conditions were totally in their favour, leading Prevost to express his displeasure in a report to the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, 'I cannot disguise from your Lordship that I feel some disappointment at the return of our squadron after being so many days in sight of the enemy's squadron without having obtained a decided advantage.' (ibid)

Prevost lost patience with Yeo's apparent restraint and ordered him to return to army co-operation duties, but not before a fourth naval action took place on the 28th September. On the latter date, in an encounter that became known as the 'Burlington Races', Yeo's flagship suffered extensive damage in action against Chauncey's General Pike. Yeo's squadron had to beat a hasty and chastening retreat, before being saved any further embarrassment by worsening weather conditions. The relationship between Prevost and his senior naval commander continued to deteriorate.

Chateauguay and Chrystler's Farm
October heralded a change of direction from the Americans, as they began to focus their largest offensive of the war towards Montreal. Prevost had received intelligence to this effect and moved from Kingston to Montreal. Having arrived, further news reached him that an army of over 7,000 men under Major General James Wilkinson was to move down the St. Lawrence River, whilst another force of over 4,000 men under General Wade Hampton would thrust north into Lower Canada from New York State.

Prevost 'concluded that the most dangerous threat came from Hampton, who was moving directly against the city; therefore, he concentrated a considerable body of troops to protect it.' (ibid)

On the 26th October Hampton's men were engaged at the mouth of the River Chateauguay by a mixed force under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles de Salaberry. Approximately 1,700 Canadian soldiers and Native Warriors forced the Americans to retreat over the swampy terrain.

Whilst the Battle of Chateauguay was being fought Wilkinson was attempting to move his men by boat from the eastern end of Lake Ontario. Given the lateness of the year for campaigning the bad weather hampered his movement. The first of his transport boats reached French Creek, where despite being harassed by a naval detachment under the command of Captain William Mulcaster, they continued throughout the first week of November towards Montreal.

Sometime earlier Prevost had ordered the formation of a corps of observation under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Morrison, 81st Foot. The British troops had left Kingston in order to prevent Wilkinson's advance down the river. They met a division of the American force under the command of Major General John Boyd at Chrystler's Farm. On the 11th November Morrison's force of approximately 800 men engaged an American force numbering over 3,000.

Morrison drew his men up in a favourable position, with the river on his right and a wood on the left. On account of the heavy rainfall the previous night Boyd was compelled to advance over muddy and recently ploughed ground. After two hours hard fighting the British advanced forcing Boyd into an overall retreat. British losses were 1 officer and 21 other ranks killed; 10 officers and 137 men wounded. The Americans suffered 339 all ranks killed or wounded, approximately 100 men taken prisoner and one field piece captured.

Soon after this defeat Wilkinson learned that Hampton was taking no further part in the advance. Being now on the Canadian bank and sandwiched between two advancing forces he decided to return to the American side. Prevost's defence of Montreal had been well planned and well executed, and in some way led to a more positive end to the campaigning season of 1813. However, the British position at the western end of the province around Detroit had eroded.

In an attempt to keep Upper Canada Prevost had focused his attention and his resources on and around Lake Ontario. This was to the detriment of Major General Henry Proctor who had been left with the command of the Detroit border, and the naval squadron on Lake Erie. During the course of 1813 America had asserted naval dominance on Lake Erie, and Proctor had suffered reverses against Harrison's Army of the Northwest at Fort Meigs and Fort Stephenson. With the supply route desperate and the alliance faltering with the Native Warriors Proctor had gambled on a decisive naval action on Lake Erie. On the 10 September 1813 the Battle of Lake Erie ended in defeat. The British naval commander was seriously wounded, his senior lieutenant killed, and the squadron fell into confusion before surrendering.

The supply lines were cut to Proctor, and he decided to retreat what was left of his force towards Burlington Heights ceding territory to Harrison as he went. On the 5th October he made what was to be a disastrous stand at Moraviatown. Proctor's troops were exhausted and starving on half rations. After what was termed the Battle of the Thames, only 50 men (including Proctor) escaped the debacle.

Prevost had anticipated that Proctor's retreat would be an ordered one, moving his force east towards the central division. This did not materialise, and fortunately the lateness of the season checked the Americans from any further advancement. Proctor was subsequently tried by court martial in Quebec for his conduct during the retreat and at the Battle of the Thames.

Prevost 'in his account to London about these events... used the opportunity to express his frustration over the lack of instructions from his superiors. "Since the commencement of the last campaign," Prevost had provided London with detailed reports and had "faithfully exposed the difficulties" of his situation, "including the inadequacy of the means afforded me by His Majesty's Government to the object - the preservation of the North American Provinces." Despite setbacks, Prevost had defended the Canadas "against the attacks of a foe whose war resources of every description are very considerable, when compared with those of myself." In 1813, the situation had changed dramatically, as improvements in the leadership and training of the American army and the unprecedented expansion of the U.S. inland naval force offered Prevost "difficulties of a new and imposing character," which, while not being insurmountable, were exacerbated by his not being "honoured with a single instruction from his Majesty's Government upon the mode of conducting the campaign since it opened to this late period." (ibid)

The issue that continued to greatly hinder Prevost was that for Britain the events unfolding in Europe mattered far more. His theatre of operations was of secondary importance at that time. This was of course the complete opposite for the Americans, for whom it was the only theatre of operations. Prevost continued to be left on his own, to achieve the best that he could whilst being expected to produce far more than he could realistically deliver. The abdication of Napoleon in 1814 should have changed all of this.

The Secretary of State for War and the Colonies wrote to Prevost thus, 'I take the earliest opportunity of acquainting you that His Majesty's Government have not failed to avail themselves of the present favourable state of affairs in Europe to order reinforcements, both of infantry and artillery, for the army under your command to proceed to Quebec as soon as they can be collected from the different quarters in which their services have hitherto been required.' (ibid)

The promise of peninsular veterans was to amount to four companies of artillery, fourteen battalions of infantry, and a contingent of cavalry. In June 1814 Prevost's superior Earl Bathurst instructed that when these reinforcements were to arrive that they be employed in a robust but essentially defensive manner. One that protected what was already established rather than proceeding in an invasive manner.

Bathurst now took a more active role coordinating all forces including the Admiralty who were to conduct seaborne operations off the American coast. Prevost had no role in operations outside of the Canadas, however, he was to influence the decision to burn Washington in August 1814. The latter course of action was decided upon by the new naval commander Vice Admiral Cochrane, mainly as a consequence of American raids on Dover in Upper Canada and destruction of private property in violation of the laws of war at St. David's and Queenston.

Prevost wrote to Cochrane 'in consequence of the late disgraceful conduct of the American troops in the wanton destruction of private property on the north shores of Lake Erie, in order that if the war with the United States continues you may, should you judge it advisable, assist in inflicting that measure of retaliation which shall deter the enemy from a repetition of similar outrages.' Cochrane agreed, 'and eventually decided he would occupy Washington, which would deliver a great "Blow to the [American] Government," while offering good quarters and supplies for the army. Thus, with a retaliatory policy that was partially inspired by Prevost, the Royal Navy commenced raiding settlements in the Chesapeake Bay area, culminating in the occupations and burning of Washington in August 1814.' (ibid)

Bathurst provided Prevost with a long list of objectives to achieve in the Canadas during the campaigning season of 1814, 'topping the list was the requirement to secure control of the lakes, destroy the enemy naval base at Sackets Harbour, and eliminate the American squadrons on Lakes Erie and Champlain. After Lake Erie was secured, Detroit was to be reoccupied and the Northwest retained for the Natives. Lastly, Prevost was to occupy an advanced position on American territory near the shore of Lake Champlain to prevent American incursions into Lower Canada. This ambitious plan was much greater than anything attempted by either side thus far in the war, including the large American offensives of late 1813. Achieving all of these objectives would require considerable planning and coordination and careful management of the logistical system. More important, it would necessitate Yeo's cooperation.

In the event, Bathurst's orders arrived too late for all of the tasks to be achieved in 1814. The re-establishment of a presence on Lake Erie and the retaking of Detroit would have to wait until 1815, while current American naval supremacy on Lake Ontario ruled out an attack on Sackets Harbour for the time being... This left Prevost with the prospect of mounting only two of the objectives he had been assigned - the related objectives of destroying the enemy naval establishment on Lake Champlain and securing an advance position on the frontier that extended toward Lake Champlain. Prevost selected Plattsburgh, New York, as the ideal objective to improve the security of Lower Canada. This offensive would be his primary effort in 1814.' (ibid)

The Plattsburgh Campaign - The Beginning of The End
The promised reinforcements, complemented by experienced field officers, arrived by the end of August. Prevost arranged both the army and naval elements proposed for the campaign. The army consisted of a division of over 10,000 troops, whilst the naval squadron comprised of four warships and several gunboats. This was the largest British force that had been assembled for a single operation during the war.

Prevost, rather than choosing one of the newly arrived officers, chose his most senior Major General (Francis de Rottenburg) as the divisional commander. He did, however, divide the command of the three brigades involved amongst the Peninsula officers. The 1st Brigade was placed under the command of Major General Frederick Robinson, and consisted of the Peninsula veterans of the 3/27th, 39th, 76th and 88th Regiments of Foot. The 2nd Brigade under the command of Major General Thomas Brisbane was comprised of soldiers already serving in Canada, the 2/8th, 13th, and 49th Regiments of Foot, the Regiment de Meuron, the Canadian Voltigeurs, and the Canadian Chasseurs. The 3rd Brigade under the command of Major General Manley Power was a mixture of soldiers with Peninsula experience and various garrisons, made up from the 3rd, 5th, 1/27th, and 58th Regiments of Foot. Each brigade was supported by a battery of five 6-pounder guns and one 5.5-inch howitzer of the Royal Artillery, and a squadron of the 19th Light Dragoons was attached to the force.

Prevost was met with a number of challenges in the short time that he had to prepare his men for the attack. There was tension amongst the command due to differences in experience, quality and outlook. Those recently arrived from the Peninsula greatly differed in their approach to those used to fighting in the North American theatre. The brigade commanders were unsure of Prevost, and he did not endear himself by issuing a general order complaining about the standards of dress amongst the recently arrived troops.

The naval contingent of his force was also not in harmony. It was poorly supplied, and crewed with a vast majority of men who had either not served together, or at sea at all. The best equipment and seaman were requisitioned by Yeo on Lake Ontario.

The Plattsburgh 'offensive began on 31st August 1814 with advance of Brisbane's brigade across the border. That day, Prevost ordered de Rottenburg, the divisional commander, to move the remainder of the division forward on 1st September. Once in American territory, Prevost issued a proclamation to the "peaceable and unoffending inhabitants" of New York State assuring them that "they have no cause for alarm from the invasion of their country for the safety of themselves or their families, of for the security of their property. So long as they acted peaceably, the local populace would be permitted to continue with business as usual." Prevost also strove to limit the potential of difficulties with civilians by not allowing the Native warriors to accompany the expedition into any towns.' (ibid)

All three British brigades had crossed into American territory by the 3rd of September. The advance proceeded in good order and the following day Prevost halted the division at Chazy. The latter was approximately 9 miles to the north of the town of Plattsburgh. British gunboats had moved up in tandem with the land forces. As Prevost proceeded he detached troops at Chazy and Champlain to secure his ever lengthening lines of communication. The American troops under Brigadier General Alexander Macomb slowly fell back burning bridges and setting up road blocks to add to the already poor conditions through which the British (especially the artillery) struggled to advance.

Three short sharp actions took place ahead of the Prevost's arrival at Plattsburgh on the 6th September. The defending forces, however, merely slowed the advance and the British cleared those in front of them with relative ease. The three brigades converged on the town, however, indecision over the next steps to be taken and a slow decision to finally carry out a reconnaissance meant that any attack could not be carried out until the following day. At '9.00am on 7th September, Prevost held a council at his headquarters. After passing on details gained from a reconnaissance of the American defences, he announced that the ground attack was postponed indefinitely because he had decided to wait "for the operation of the flotilla under Captain Downie." In the meantime, the troops would "remain in their present positions until further notice." He ordered that batteries be erected and that guns, ammunition, and stores be moved forward using whatever transport was available. The deficiency in transport delayed the arrival of two medium 12 pounders and two 8 inch mortars, both necessary for siege work, that Prevost had ordered taken from the garrison at Isle aux Noix. The result was that, by the time Prevost was ready to launch the attack on the 11th, the only siege ordnance in position were two experimental light brass 24 pounder guns that were unsuitable for the task ahead.' (ibid)

Macomb's force comprised of about 1,800 regulars, and 3,400 militiamen from New York and Vermont. The defences of Plattsburgh were well established, and consisted of three forts and a number of other fortified points on the east side of the Saranac River. Fort Moreau was armed with 12 guns, and Fort Brown and Fort Scott were both armed with 8 guns respectively. These were also interspersed with manned blockhouses. Prevost was consistent with his cautious approach and decided to lay siege rather than going for an all-out assault.

Prevost's troops certainly had strength in numbers, however, they lacked the necessary skilled personnel of sappers and gunners to carry out the siege. His decision to wait for the arrival of the full naval squadron was not helped by the delays in the completion of the frigate H.M.S. Confiance, which was to be the mainstay of Captain George Downie's squadron. In fact the Confiance only left the dockyard of the Isle de Noix on the 8th September, with the crew still working on her as she travelled. Of equal importance was that Yeo had only replaced the previous squadron commander with Downie, the day after Prevost had already set off for Plattsburgh. Downie had no knowledge of the campaign plan, did not know his command and had not met Prevost.

On the 8th September Prevost requested that Downie go straight into the action, however, he replied that the Confiance was still not ready for action and as such he was not willing to risk the entire squadron. On the evening of the 9th Downie informed Prevost that he would attack the following morning. Prevost 'was delighted with this information and immediately gave order for the Left Division to prepare to attack on the morning of the 10th September. The troops would be ready from 'six o'clock this morning to storm the enemy's works at nearly the same moment as the naval action should commence in the Bay.' The wind then changed again, however, preventing Downie from sailing into position. Prevost's frustration was evident in his next letter to the naval commander: "I ascribe the disappointment I have experienced to the unfortunate change of wind and shall rejoice to learn that my reasonable expectations have been frustrated by no other means."' (ibid)

The combined attack was re-scheduled to take place on the 11th September. Prevost planned for Brisbane to attack from the north, and Robinson from the south. During the night the artillery was manoeuvred into position. Prevost met with Robinson early in the morning of the 11th and final orders were given. Downie's squadron had scaled their guns indicating that he was moving in to position. As Robinson and Brisbane readied themselves, Prevost moved his headquarters to a position that enabled him to view both Cumberland Bay and the peninsula.

British artillery fire opened on the American positions and Robinson's men started to skirmish, 'Everything was ready for the attack, or so it seemed. Robinson had "hardly reached the front" to supervise the next stage of the attack when in the early afternoon Cochrance returned with an order from Prevost - who had witnessed the naval battle from his headquarters - that had been issued at noon. It stated that since two of the British warships had struck their colours, Robinson and his men were to break off the action and return to Prevost's location.' (ibid)

The naval engagement had gone disastrously wrong from a British perspective. The lack of a favourable wind had exposed Downie's flag ship to the full firepower of the American squadron. Unable to manoeuvre out of harm's way Downie had been killed early in the exchange. The Confiance suffered many casualties amongst her crew, and two other British vessels were put out of action. As a consequence Prevost was not willing to continue the land attack without the naval element of his assault.

The artillery was withdrawn, and 'once reassembled, the Left Division spent the night of 11th September near Plattsburgh. During the evening, Prevost had decided to withdraw back to Canada and ordered the movement to commence two hours before daybreak on 12th September. He then composed a report to Bathurst that explained his decision to withdraw:

"Scarcely had His Majesty's Troops forced passage across the Saranac and ascended the Height on which stand the enemy's works, when I had the Mortification to hear the Shout of Victory from the Enemy's Works in consequence of the British Flag being lowered on board the Confiance and Linnet... This unlooked for event depriving me of the Cooperation of the Fleet without which the further Prosecution of the Service was become impracticable, I did not hesitate to arrest the course of the Troops advancing to the attack because the most complete success would have been unavailing, and the possession of the Enemy's Works offered no advantage to compensate for the loss we must have sustained in acquiring Possession of them."' (ibid)

Surplus stores and munitions were destroyed, before the British forces commenced their retreat back to Canada on the 12th September. The frontier into Lower Canada was reached two days later. Once Prevost had returned to Montreal he 'sent a second, private letter to Bathurst that elaborated on his decision to withdraw. He stated it was necessary due to the loss of the naval support, rising desertion in the division, a potential threat from local militia, and the poor state of the roads, which so affected his line of communication that further delay would make a march back to Canada more difficult. Prevost had to choose, he said, "whether I should consider my own Fame by gratifying the Ardor of the Troops in persevering in the Attack, or consult the more substantial interests of my Country by withdrawing the Army which was yet uncrippled for the security of these Provinces"' (ibid)

Prevost's thoughts of preservation were not what was required by his superiors at that time. An overwhelming victory had become a necessity and it now appeared, despite his best intentions, that Prevost was not the man qualified to achieve this. Once the Left Division 'crossed the frontier, Prevost's supervision of the campaign was uninspired. His leadership could not overcome the shortfalls in the divisional staff, which proved incapable of coordinating the complexities of the advance, the construction of siege works, and the making of final preparations for the assault of Plattsburgh. His appointment of de Rottenburg as commander of the Left Division proved unsound; as a result, Prevost had to take direct command of that formation. Prevost's greatest transgression was in leaving the detailed coordination of the naval and land attacks to his aides, rather than undertaking these arrangements personally with Downie. Had he instead chosen to ride the few short miles to where the naval squadron was moored, Prevost most certainly could have avoided the confusion that ensued on 11th September, and perhaps eliminated the acrimony that ensued afterward over the conduct of the campaign.

The commander in chief may have mishandled parts of his command, but at least he did not lead the Left Division to destruction. Nor was he responsible for the fate of the naval squadron, which he had supported in every way he could. He emerged from the campaign at the centre of a great controversy that included not only the army's interests but also those of the navy and influential English merchants and civilians.' (ibid)

The campaign season ended in autumn, and despite not achieving the success that was required Prevost continued to make preparations for the following year. The signing of the Treaty of Ghent in December 1814, however, changed everything. The treaty was ratified in February 1815, and the war between Britain and America ended. With peace secured full details of the unsuccessful campaign now filtered through to Britain, and Prevost's subordinates were quick to relay their dissatisfaction with their commanding officer. In particular Yeo, who wrote a series of reports to the Admiralty bitterly complaining about the fate of Downie and his squadron and the role that Prevost had played in this. It is quite possible that this was to deflect attention away from his own part during the campaign.

Allegations were made regarding Prevost's conduct at Plattsburgh, and indeed the public tide started to turn against him. Defamatory articles appeared in both the newspapers of Canada and Britain. The British Government concluded that the apparent loss of confidence in the governor general was too serious to let him continue in office. The decision to recall Prevost was carried out without hearing his account.

On the 2nd March 1815 Major General Sir George Murray arrived in Quebec to inform Prevost of the government's instructions, and that he found himself being recalled with his conduct in question. Three days later he wrote to Bathurst:

"This is the first and only notice I have received from your Lordship respecting my conduct at Plattsburgh, and I cannot but express the surprise excited by the nature, as well as the mode of this communication. Conscious of no fault I dread not the strictest investigation, but it appears adding unnecessary poignancy to the unexpected blow, that the mortification you have judged proper to inflict should be conveyed through a third person and this an officer so much my junior in the Service.

Your Lordship states that the revocation of my commission as Governor General is not meant to mark His Royal Highness the Prince Regent's displeasure: unfortunately the distinction will be very difficult for the world to discover, and I must confess that to my own feelings the circumstances may probably be that I remain some time from severity of climate, or other circumstances (as your Lordship observes) seeing myself deprived of every authority and every emolument after four years of the most arduous duties I have performed in the course of the five and thirty I have devoted to His Majesty's service, unless to avoid such an interval I should prefer passing through the United States like a fugitive."' (ibid)

Prevost disbanded the embodied militia and dealt with a number of fiscal matters before departing for England in the first week of April. During the course of his journey his health began to deteriorate, and he eventually arrived at Portsmouth on the 11th May 1815. In August 1815 a naval court-martial was carried out over the operations at Plattsburgh. During this procedure Prevost was condemned, and the findings of the court-martial were made public. This 'was too much for Prevost, and he protested the publication of the findings to the Duke of York, the commander in chief of the army, complaining their public release was both premature and unjust. Prevost stated it was unfair of the court to reach these conclusions "as his conduct and that of the army under his command not being properly the subject of their enquiry." Prevost was angered by the failure of his accusers to address their accusations directly against him and requested York's assistance in causing the charges to be produced in legal form to provide him the opportunity of "vindicating his character and conduct."' (ibid)

By October a list of 41 witnesses had been compiled, and their readiness to attend a court-martial secured. In December 1815 it was announced that the court-martial would sit at the Royal Hospital in Chelsea on the 15th January the following year. During this time Prevost's health had deteriorated even further, and he developed Dropsy. As a consequence the court-martial was re-scheduled to take place on the 5th February.

The court-martial never convened, nor was Prevost given the opportunity to clear his name, as he died on the 5th January 1815. Prevost's brother wrote to the Duke of York requesting that the court-martial proceed, but it was advised by the Judge Advocate General that court-martial or indeed a court of inquiry would achieve nothing given the death of one of the parties. Meanwhile, 'given the circumstances, the Prince Regent, the head of state in the continued illness of George III, felt obliged to provide the Prevost family with an acknowledgement of Sir George's many years of dedicated service. An offer of a peerage was made to Prevost's son, George, who declined the honour because the family could not financially support a title... The Prince Regent therefore suggested the additional honour of granting "supporters" for the family coat of arms might be appropriate; and this offer was accepted by Lady Prevost. The grant was published in the London Gazette in September 1816, with the following description: "On either side a grenadier of the 16th (or Bedfordshire) regiment of foot, each supporting a banner; that on the dexter side inscribed 'West Indies', and that on the sinister, 'Canada'; and the said supporters, together with the motto servatum cineri [Faith Kept with the Dead], may also be borne by Sir George Prevost, Baronet, son of the said late Lieutenant General, and by his successors." This was a rare distinction, and it is the oldest such award that has been made to a baronet in England.' (ibid)

A letter from Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool in November 1814, whilst discussing the idea of the Duke replacing Prevost, may have offered the latter some peace:
"That which appears to me to be wanting in America is not a General, or General Officers and troops, but a naval superiority on the Lakes. Till that superiority is acquired, it is impossible, according to my notion, to maintain an army in such a situation as to keep the enemy out of the whole frontier, much less to make any conquest from the enemy, which, with those superior means, might, with reasonable hopes of success, be undertaken. I may be wrong in this opinion, but I think the whole history of the war proves its truth; and I suspect that you will find that Prevost will justify his misfortunes, which, by the bye, I am quite certain are not what the Americans have represented them to be, by stating that the navy were defeated, and even if he had taken Fort Moreau he must have retired. The question is, whether we can acquire this naval superiority on the Lakes. If we cannot I shall do you but little good in America; and I shall go there only to prove the truth of Prevost's defence, and to sign a peace which might as well be signed now.'

Sir George Prevost was buried in the family crypt at St. Mary the Virgin, East Barnet in Hertfordshire. His family erected a memorial to him in Winchester Cathedral, the inscription for which was worded thus:
"Sacred to the memory of Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost Baronet of Belmont in this county; Governor General and Commander in Chief of the British forces in North America, in which command by his wise and energetic measures and with a very inferior force he preserved the Canadas to the British Crown from the repeated invasions of a powerful enemy his constitution at length sunk under incessant mental and bodily exertion in discharging the duties of that arduous station and having returned to England he died shortly afterwards in London on the 5th of January1816. Aged 48 years thirty four of which had been devoted to the service of his country he was interred near the remains of his father Major General Augustin Prevost at East Barnet in Hertfordshire his Royal Sovereign the Prince Regent "To evince in an especial manner the sense he entertained of his distinguished conduct and services during a long period of constant and active employment in stations of great trust both military and civil was pleased to ordain as a lasting memorial of his majesty's royal favour that the names of the countries where his courage and abilities had most signally displayed the West Indies and Canada should be inscribed on the banners of the supporters granted to be borne by his family and descendants in testimony of his private worth, his piety, integrity and his benevolence..."

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